The argument over how Nigeria should prosecute alleged coup plotters has returned to the forefront of public conversation during a time of increased political vigilance and rekindled concerns about national stability.
It is not just guilt or innocence that is at issue. It concerns jurisdiction, a constitutional issue that lies at the nexus of military discipline, democratic government, and the rule of law.
The subject at hand is deceptively straightforward: Should people suspected of planning to overthrow the government be tried in civilian courts or in the military’s court-martial system?
As is always the case with Nigeria’s constitutional structure, the solution is based on what could be called a dual-track constitution.
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution has two distinct justice systems, each with its own goals and parameters. Sections 6 and 36 serve as the foundation for the civilian judiciary, which protects fundamental rights and decides cases involving crimes against the state. The purpose of the military justice system, which is protected by Sections 217, 218, and 315, is to uphold discipline within the armed forces.
Occasionally, these two systems clash, particularly when troops and civilians are accused of participating in the same purported conspiracy in politically delicate situations.
The Constitution is unambiguous for citizens. According to Section 251(2), the Federal High Court has sole jurisdiction over treason and treasonable felonies. For this reason, a civilian court tried and found businessman Muhammadu Mandara guilty during the Second Republic of organizing troops to overthrow President Shehu Shagari.
No matter how serious the accusation, Mandara’s case serves as a reminder to law scholars that civilians cannot be tried in military tribunals.
For active military troops, the situation is significantly different. The Armed Forces Act, which is protected by Section 315 of the Constitution, gives the military the power to discipline its own members. The status of the accused, rather than the nature of the offense, is what initiates court-martial jurisdiction.
Nigerian appellate courts have regularly upheld this idea. The Court of Appeal ruled in Brigadier-General Anyankpele v. Nigerian Army that court-martial procedures are constitutionally legitimate and fell under the judicial powers acknowledged by Section 6.
In the eyes of soldiers, a coup attempt constitutes not only treason under civilian law, but also mutiny, insubordination, and behavior that is detrimental to military discipline, all of which fall under the Armed Forces Act.
Although citizens implicated in the same scheme face the Federal High Court, soldiers accused of coup plotting have generally been tried by court-martial due to its dual character.
Nigerian courts have always had to strike a careful balance between military discipline and civilian supremacy. Tribunals took center stage during the military regime. The courts have adopted a more assertive stance under democracy, upholding the constitutional limitations of military justice while demanding due process.
The judiciary has supported court-martial proceedings for serving troops, ruled against attempts to convict civilians in military courts, demanded strict respect to fair-hearing norms, and stepped in when military tribunals overreached their statutory authority in politically contentious instances.
A larger constitutional idea is reflected in this delicate balancing act: the military must maintain discipline but never take precedence over civilian power.
The topic has been rekindled by recent accusations of coup plotting, allegedly including active military officers.
Since treason is an offense against the democratic order, rights attorney Femi Falana (SAN) has maintained that all suspects, including troops, should face trial in civilian courts.
Constitutional supremacy is the foundation of his morally sound stance. However, it faces a long-standing legal reality: Nigerian courts have always recognized the military’s right to trial its own personnel, and the Constitution explicitly maintains military discipline.
Only civilians are affected by the Mandara precedent, which is frequently brought up in public discussions. The issue of how to handle soldiers who are accused of planning a coup remains unresolved.
In the end, Nigeria’s constitutional system strikes a practical equilibrium. People who are suspected of plotting against the state are put on trial in public, with the public watching. The military system that oversees their service is where soldiers who are accused of the same offense are tried.
It is a dual-track strategy that is flawed, contentious, and intentional.
Even in times of political unrest, the court serves as the silent referee as Nigeria fortifies its democratic institutions, guaranteeing that the rule of law is upheld and that neither system goes too far.
Ultimately, the road map is provided by the Constitution. The guiding light comes from the courts. The country keeps a tight eye on things, knowing that the way we prosecute suspected coup plotters reveals just as much about our democracy as the accusations themselves.
